This paper examines whether there is a natural barrier to entry in the credit rating industry. We consider an in…nite horizon model in which each period, an original incumbent faces competition from an entrant randomly selected from a pool of ex ante identical potential entrants. The incumbent's accuracy is imperfect, constant and known while each entrant's true accuracy is unknown and can be perfect or completely noisy.
Introduction
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) are considered a central culprit in the current …nancial turmoil. By giving safe investment ratings to subprime mortgages, they signi…cantly contributed to create mortgage bust. In this paper, we show that the questionable accuracy in current ratings can be due to natural barrier 1 that hinders potentially more accurate
CRAs from entering the credit rating business and replacing less e¢ cient incumbents. We present an in…nite horizon model that studies the competition between a relatively ine¤ec-tive incumbent CRA and a sequence of entrant CRAs that are potentially more e¤ective but whose ability in apprising default risk is unproven at the time they enter the market. We show that when CRAs'private information cannot be credibly disclosed, market fails in selecting the most competent CRA among the incumbent and the pool of entrants. In other words, a rather incompetent CRA can dominate the market without being worried about potentially more competent entrants. Understanding how competition between an incumbent and an entrant works in the credit rating industry is a prerequisite for any reform of the industry. A striking fact about the credit rating industry is its persistent fewness of incumbents (White, 2002) . According to Co¤ee (2006) "Since early in the 20th century, credit ratings have been dominated by a duopoly -Moody's Investors Services, Inc. (Moody's) and Standard & Poor's Ratings Services (Standard & Poor's) ." (Co¤ee, p.284) .
Even though one admits that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)'s awarding, since 1973, of "Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations" (NRSROs) status only to a small number of CRAs created an arti…cial barrier to entry, the persistent level of concentration before the promulgation of NRSRO status suggests that there might be some natural barrier to entry into this market even in the absence of this arti…cial barrier to entry. Furthermore, the SEC attributes paucity of NRSROs to natural barrier to entry, which reduces the number of applications.
2 Scarcity of applications to the status of NRSRO is also at odds with the high pro…tability of the credit rating business. 3 Our paper 1 The meaning of natural barrier is explained later on in the introduction. 2 In a hearing held on April 2, 2003 on rating agencies before the Capital Markets Subcommittee of the House of Financial Services Committee, Annette Nazareth (director of the division of market regulation for the SEC) said, "Again, we think that there are some natural barriers to entry here. There have not been that many applications." See page 20 at http://…nancialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/108-18.pdf 3 On avergae, between 1995 and 2000, Moody's annual net income amounted to 41.1% of its total assets (White, 2002) .
identi…es a mechanism that generates such a natural entry barrier. For this purpose, we consider a stylized model of in…nite horizon in which each period an incumbent CRA faces competition from an entrant randomly selected from a pool of potential entrants. All CRAs are, potentially, long-term players. Each period, there is a short-lived …rm, called issuer, who needs to obtain the rating of its security issued to …nance a risky project. A rating is an assessment of the quality of the project and hence of the security's default risk. When choosing between hiring an entrant or an incumbent CRA, the issuer takes into account both the di¤erence in their rating fees and in the reliability of their ratings. In fact, the reduction in the issuer's cost of capital resulting from a good rating increases with the reliability of the rater.
If requested to rate a project, a CRA receives a private signal regarding the quality of the project. We assume that the signal of the original incumbent CRA, i.e. the incumbent in the …rst period, is imperfectly correlated with the project quality. The precision of this signal (hence the reputation of the original incumbent) is imperfect, constant and known to everybody. An entrant CRA can be either perfectly accurate (i.e. it receives a perfect signal) or inaccurate (i.e. it receives a completely noisy signal) and its actual accuracy is unknown to everybody (including the entrant itself). All potential entrants are ex ante identical. What we have in mind is that the incumbent such as Moody's and S & P's has been in the market for long time and therefore an extra correct (or incorrect) rating does not change much its reputation. On the other hand, an entrant has not yet been given opportunities to make ratings and therefore its reputation is more sensitive to new information. It is assumed that an entrant's initial reputation (i.e. the probability to be accurate) is lower than the original incumbent's known imperfect accuracy. However, conditionally on truthfully reporting its signal, by correctly evaluating a project, the entrant's reputation becomes higher than that of the original incumbent.
Since some recent papers (Bolton et al. 2009 , Mathis et al. 2009 and Skreta and Veldkamp 2009 ) attribute the rating in ‡ation, which was a cause of the current …nancial crisis, to rating shopping 4 and rating fees that create con ‡icts of interest 5 on the part of CRAs, we consider in most part of the paper (except for section 6) that each CRA charges a constant fee that does not depend on its rating as was proposed in the Cuomo plan 6 . We 4 According to New York Times Magazine, "Triple-A-Failure," April 27, 2008, "the banks pay only if
Moody's delivers the desired rating." According to United States Securities and Exchange Commission (2008, p.10) "Typically, the rating agency is paid only if the credit rating is issued, though sometimes it receives a breakup fee for the analytic work undertaken even if the credit rating is not issued." 5 See the sentence cited in section 7 the description of the current rating fee structure. 6 The Cuomo plan, which is an agreement between New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo and the three main CRAs, requires that the issuers pay CRAs upfront for their rating, not contingent on also assume away rating shopping (i.e. any rating is publicly disclosed).
In each period the current entrant and the current incumbent compete in fees to attract an issuer. In the …rst period, the original incumbent competes with an entrant. While we allow CRAs to charge a negative fee to attract issuer, we assume that CRAs cannot stay inde…nitely in business without generating a strictly positive pro…t. 7 More precisely, a period t entrant that fails to build up reputation by the end of the period has to leave the market and is replaced by a new entrant from the pool. If on the contrary, the current entrant builds a reputation of being more accurate than the incumbent, then the latter exits the business and is replaced by a new entrant in the following period. We focus on whether the market provides a right incentive to experiment with entrants and select the most accurate CRA. For this purpose we …rst characterize the socially optimal experimentation policy when the signal of each CRA is public information and …nd that it is preferable to always hire the original incumbent instead of optimally experimenting with the entrants if and only if the incumbent's accuracy is su¢ ciently larger than the entrants' ex ante reputation. Secondly, we compare this policy with the market outcome induced by competition. To identify the causes of entry barrier, we distinguish two cases depending on whether a CRA's signal is public information or private information.
When the signal is public information, we …nd that the market provides issuers with an excessive incentive to experiment with entrants. In the market equilibrium, the original incumbent maintains its monopoly position only if its accuracy is substantially larger than the entrant's reputation. However the incumbent loses competition against an entrant also for some level of accuracy for which it would be socially optimal not to hire entrants. This excessive experimentation is due to the fact that an identical entrant is more aggressive with respect to the original incumbent than with respect to an incumbent who once was an entrant in the pool. When competing against the original incumbent, an entrant pledges its future pro…t that it can generate by making a successful prediction that allows it to replace the original incumbent. On the contrary, when competing against an incumbent who started as an entrant, it does not pledge its future pro…t since even if it improves its reputation by making one successful prediction, its reputation cannot be superior to that of the incumbent and hence must exit the market before the next period. This fact implies that the competition from a sequence of identical entrants reduces more the continuation payo¤ of the original incumbent than that of an incumbent who started as an entrant and eventually induces the entrant to win too often the competition against the original incumbent. However, the market provides the right incentive to experiment with entrants the report.
7 This is because remaining in the market requires to incur some …xed cost.
if the initial reputation of an entrant is close enough to the reputation of the original incumbent. Then, it is socially optimal to experiment with entrants and in equilibrium any entrant wins the competition against the original incumbent and the market eventually reaches a steady state in which an accurate type CRA provides ratings forever. By contrast, when the signal is private information, in equilibrium there never is any experimentation of entrants and hence the original incumbent always stays in the market as the dominant CRA. The driving force of the result is the reputational con ‡ict of interest: an entrant cannot credibly commit to truthful reporting of its private signal when requested to give a rating. In particular, conditional on receiving a bad signal, it has a strong incentive to give a good rating. To be precise, consider a candidate equilibrium of truth-telling and suppose that an entrant receives a bad signal. Then, if it gives a bad rating, the project will not be implemented and hence it will be replaced by a new entrant. If it gives a good rating, the project will be implemented and with some luck (since, in expectation, the entrant's signal is imperfect) the project will succeed. Then, the entrant's reputation increases and can replace the original incumbent. Hence the entrant would have an incentive to always report a good rating, implying that in equilibrium one cannot rely on its rating. The result that an entrant faces a strong temptation to in ‡ate ratings is consistent with empirical …ndings that less established competitors, such as Fitch, have at times been perceived as more generous in their ratings than S&P or Moody's. (Co¤ee, 2006, p. 300) .
Our results suggest that the policies proposed to eliminate rating in ‡ation of the incumbent CRAs, namely the Cuomo plan and no rating shopping, may not be useful in eliminating natural barriers of entry. Even though, in our model, we incorporated the Cuomo plan and assumed away rating shopping, the natural barrier to entry exists. Furthermore, it is clear that the reputational con ‡ict of interest that an entrant faces still remains even if we switch from issuer-pays pricing to investor-pays pricing. This is consistent with the fact that the credit rating market has been dominated by the duopoly of Moody's and S&P's both before and after the switch occurred in the 1970s after the invention of photocopy machines. We …nd that the con ‡ict of interest can be eliminated if an entrant CRA is allowed to charge fees contingent on ratings such that a fee contingent on bad rating is much higher than a fee contingent on good rating. However, this kind of contingent fees is incompatible with rating shopping. As long as issuers have a …nal saying about whether or not to disclose a rating, any issuer prefers making a bad rating not disclosed to paying an extra fee to make a bad rating disclosed.
Some recent papers have o¤ered explanations of the CRAs'failures. Mathis et al. (2009) study how an opportunistic CRA can build reputation for being fully committed to always truthfully revealing its private signal regarding the quality of an issuer's project. They show that when a large fraction of the CRA's income comes from rating complex projects, as soon as the CRA's reputation for being committed is strong enough, it is optimal for an opportunistic CRA to be too lax in its rating. Their model is a model of reputation à la Benabou and Laroque (1992) who consider a monopoly CRA that faces no competition from other CRAs. Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) consider a static model where an issuer can buy and make public one or more signals regarding the quality of the project it wants to …nance. They assume CRAs are committed to truthfully report their signal. CRA's signals are conditionally independently distributed and their accuracy decrease with the complexity of the project to assess. They show that since an issuer can choose which signal to make public, only best ratings are published and this biases published rating to be good even if CRAs truthfully report their signals to the issuer. Bolton et al. (2009) consider a static model where CRAs receive private signals regarding the quality of an issuer's project. As in Mathis et al. (2009) , CRAs can manipulate their ratings but su¤er an exogenous cost for misreporting. In their model a fraction of investors are naive and take ratings at face value. They show that CRAs may in ‡ate their ratings when the fraction of naive investors is large enough and/or when CRAs'misreporting costs are low enough. Boot et al. (2006) take a di¤erent approach and study the role that a rating agency can have as a coordination device in the presence of multiple equilibria. None of these papers study the entry problem in the credit rating business. In the …rst three papers, rating in ‡ation of incumbent CRA(s) is due to the fact that CRAs deliberately decide to issue overoptimistic ratings, and/or issuers choose to publish only good ratings. Our paper is the …rst studying the entry game in the credit rating business and explains how a nonaccurate CRA can maintain a monopolistic position even when potentially accurate CRAs can enter the market. In our model, an entrant has an incentive to in ‡ate rating because of its imperfect accuracy and the fact that securities with bad rating are not issued.
On the theoretical literature on certi…cation agency, a number of papers have analyzed the endogenous disclosure policy of a certi…cation agency in a static set up. This was done by Lizzeri (1999) for the case of a monopolistic certi…cation agency and further extended in Doherty et al. (2009) for the case of static competitions among rating agencies. In Faure-Grimaud et al. (2009) , the optimal contract regarding the ownership of the rating is analyzed when the decision to obtain a rating is endogenous.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses the case of publicly observable CRAs' signals analyzing both the socially optimal experimentation policy and the market equilibrium. Section 4 studies the market equilibrium when CRAs'signals are private information. In Section 5, we perform three extensions: a general distribution of an entrant's type, multiple issuers, multiple ratings per issuer. In section 6, we analyze the equilibrium when CRAs'signals are private but contingent rating fees are allowed. Section 7 contains some policy implications. Conclusions are in Section 8. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
Issuers and Investors
We consider a model of in…nite periods. In each period t = 1; :::; there is a short-lived cashless …rm, named issuer t, who wants to issue a security for …nancing an investment project. We normalize the cost of the project to 1. Let e X t 2 fX; 0g denote the return from the project of issuer t. With probability := 1=2, the project is of good quality and e X t = X > 1. With probability 1 the project is of bad quality and e X t = 0. The project's quality is unknown to everybody including to the issuer himself. Returns of issuers'projects are independently and identically distributed.
Investors are risk neutral and competitive. We normalize the market interest rate of a risk-free bond to zero. In the absence of any additional information about the project, if X 1 0, the project will be …nanced. Then investors'required interest rate on the corporate bond is y := (1 )= leaving X 1= to the issuer's shareholders if the project is successful and 0 otherwise. If X 1 < 0, then no investment takes place. We shall consider both cases X 1= and X < 1= .
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs)
Issuer t can hire a CRA to rate its bonds. In order to provide a rating the CRA has to gather public and con…dential information about the issuer t by auditing the …rm, meeting its executives and analyzing the …rm's investment project etc. These activities have a cost c 0 that a CRA must pay to receive a private signal regarding the quality of the project. Upon accepting to rate an issuer, a CRA is assumed to spend c: there is no moral hazard on c since the issuer can check it.
8 Let s it 2 fG; Bg represent the private signal received by CRA i regarding issuer t. We assume that CRA i's rating, denoted by r it , belongs to fG; Bg and any rating is disclosed (i.e. no rating shopping on the part of issuers). For the most part, we assume that c is large enough that the issuer buys only one rating. In section 5, we consider an extension to multiple ratings.
Accuracy and Reputation
There are two kinds of rating agencies: the original incumbent and a pool of in…nite number of ex ante identical potential entrants. Let i = I represent the original incumbent CRA. We assume that the original incumbent's signal is informative but not perfect. We will denote with q = Pr s It = Gj e X t = X = Pr s It = Bj e X t = 0 the probability that the incumbent's signal re ‡ects the true quality of the project and we assume 1=2 < q < 1. Let I = 2q 1 2 (0; 1) denote the original incumbent's accuracy or reputation.
Let i = Et represent the potential entrant CRA entering the credit rating market at period t. Any potential entrant CRA can be of two types: it can be accurate or inaccurate. An accurate type receives the signal G (B) whenever the project is good (bad). An inaccurate CRA's signal is not informative about the project's quality and equals G or B with probability 1=2 regardless of the true value of e X t . Thus, an accurate (inaccurate) entrant receives a signal that is always more (less) precise than the original incumbent's signal. Conditional on the project being good (or bad), the signals that competing CRAs receive are independently distributed. The type of an entrant CRA is unknown to everybody including to the entrant itself. Let Et = E be the initial belief that an entrant is accurate. The parameter E can be interpreted either as the entrant's initial expected accuracy or its initial reputation. All potential entrants in the pool have the same initial reputation.
Let it be CRAi's reputation at the beginning of period t and suppose that CRAi received the signal G at t. Then, we have
is the belief that period-t project is of good quality given CRAi with reputation it received signal s it = G. This is an increasing function of it with G (0) = . In a similar way,
That is, B ( it )
represents the belief period-t project is good given signal s it = B from a CRA with reputation it .
In the absence of CRAs, the social surplus in period t is max f0; X 1g. If a CRA is hired and the project is implemented only if its signal is G, the social surplus is
We assume:
The …rst inequality in A1 says that the reputation of the original incumbent is not smaller than the initial reputation of an entrant. The second inequality implies that any CRA's initial reputation is above the minimum necessary to justify, from a social planner's perspective, the investment of c to generate the CRA's private signal. Beside, this implies that each CRA's reputation is large enough to convince investors to …nance (to dissuade investors from …nancing) the project when the CRA's signal is good (bad).
Evolution of reputation
We assume that the original incumbent's reputation I is …xed and commonly known. This assumption is not crucial as long as long as the incumbent's reputation is not too sensitive to an additional news regarding its rating performance. This happens when the incumbent has been in the business for a long time and its long record of rating performance leaves little uncertainty regarding its rating accuracy. On the contrary, an entrant has not yet given many opportunities to make rating to demonstrate its rating accuracy. As a consequence, the entrant's reputation can vary sharply as new information about its accuracy is revealed by its rating performance.
Formally, in period t, consider a CRA i 6 = I with reputation i and suppose that it received private signal s it 2 fG; Bg regarding the period t project. Let ! t denote the event realized at the end of period t. When s it is observable, there are …ve possible events:
G meaning that the project was …nanced with a CRA i's good signal and it succeeded.
! t = F G meaning that the project was …nanced with a CRA i's good signal and it failed.
! t = S B meaning that the project was …nanced with a CRA i's bad signal and it succeeded.
! t = F B meaning that the project was …nanced with a CRA i's bad signal and it failed.
! t = N meaning that the project was not …nanced.
Thus it is possible to update belief regarding CRA i's true accuracy by observing ! t , i.e., by comparing the outcome of the project e X t with the CRA's signal s i . Namely,
where the last equality follows from the fact that if the project is not implemented, nothing can be learned about the entrant's accuracy. When i = E , let
. We assume:
A2:
A2 says that if an entrant is given a chance to rate an issuer and if its truthful revelation of signal turns out to be correct, then this boosts its reputation such that its reputation becomes superior to that of the original incumbent. Since + E > E , A2 is equivalent to E > I =(2 I ) and A1 and A2 are satis…ed if and only if max f min ; I =(2 I )g < E I .
CRAs'survival dynamics
We design the survival dynamics of active CRAs to gather the idea that no CRAs can stay in the business for too long without generating positive pro…ts. In our model, the length of one period shall be interpreted as the time elapsed between the issuance of a rating and the observation of the outcome of the rated project, i.e. the maturity of an issuer's debt. Formally, we assume:
An active CRA that does not generate a positive pro…t over two consecutive periods exits the market by the end of the second of the two periods. When this happens, the exit is de…nitive and the surviving CRA, if any, becomes the next period incumbent CRA. An exiting CRA is replaced by a new active entrant from the pool of potential entrants.
Assumption A3(i) means that a CRA is liquidated when it is not able to generate any positive pro…t over two consecutive periods. In order to capture the idea that in the real world, a CRA has to sustain some …xed annual cost to be present in the market we make this additional simplifying assumption:
If a CRA active in period t expects to generate no pro…t in the future or has generated no positive pro…t in period t and anticipates no positive pro…t from staying in the market in period t + 1, it will exit the market at the end of period t.
Given that the length of one period should be interpreted as the US corporate bond average maturity of 10 years 9 , the survival rule implied by Assumptions A3(i) (respectively, A3(ii)) is intentionally lenient toward entrant CRAs, as it implies that a CRA can stay in business two decades (respectively, one decade) without generating any positive pro…t. Note also that a CRA active in period t that realizes a reputation of being completely inaccurate cannot improve it and hence cannot hope to compete with other CRA in the future. Hence according to Assumption A3(ii), it will exit the market at the end of t.
Finally, we introduce a tie-breaking rule that will be applied only to an o¤-the equilibrium event.
A3(iii):
If period-t issuer is indi¤erent between hiring the entrant or the incumbent it will opt for the latter.
In each period an active entrant CRA is randomly chosen from the pool of in…nitely many potential entrant CRAs. Period-t active entrant and period t incumbent approach period t issuer and compete to be hired by the issuer. Thus while in period 1, the original incumbent I competes with period 1 entrant, in a generic period t, the period t incumbent is either the original incumbent I or a past entrant (in case the original incumbent I has already been forced out of business) and will compete with period t entrant.
Contracts
We assume that each period, each CRA simultaneously o¤ers a short-term contract, which is a …xed fee f it that an issuer must pay regardless of the rating that the CRA gives. This case of a …xed fee corresponds to the fee scheme under the Cuomo plan. Our results are robust if we allow a CRA to charge a positive fee contingent on the good rating in addition to the …xed fee, which corresponds to the situation before the Cuomo plan. Given that investors are risk-neutral and competitive and that each CRA's reputation is higher than min , an issuer can get …nancing to pay for the fee to a CRA.
One period benchmark
Consider as a benchmark a single period competition between two CRAs. Then, actually it is optimal for each CRA to o¤er a contract based only on a …xed fee since this gives it the incentive to truthfully reveal its signal. If the two CRAs charge the same fee, then the issuer will prefer to be rated by the CRA with the higher reputation, as this maximizes the expected pro…t from implementing a project with good rating. Consider it jt . Then, in equilibrium, CRA j charges the fee f jt = c. CRA i charges the fee such that the issuer is indi¤erent between the two CRAs.
Lemma 1 In a single period model, if it jt , then,
CRA i rates the project and realizes a pro…t of ( it jt ) X 4
.
Public information
In this section we consider the benchmark in which the signal of each CRA is public information. Since each CRA's reputation is above min and signals are publicly observable, only a project that receives a good rating will be implemented. This implies that only events S G , F G and N can happen.
Social welfare
We …rst study as a benchmark the case in which a social planner can decide which CRAs to hire to maximize social welfare. In period one, there are two possibilities: either it is socially optimal to hire an entrant CRA or the original incumbent. Suppose …rst that it is socially optimal to hire an entrant CRA in t = 1. Then, in the event of N , and a fortiori in the event of S G , it is optimal to continue to hire the same CRA in t = 2. In the event of F G , it is optimal to hire a new entrant (di¤erent from the entrant who realized the F G event). Thus, when it is optimal to hire an entrant CRA in t = 1, the optimal experimentation policy consists in (i) continuing to have projects rated by the entrant CRA of t = 1 as long as he does not realize an
replacing him with a new entrant with fresh reputation E who should rate projects until an event F G happens etc. Under this optimal experimentation, eventually an entrant of accurate type will be recruited and will rate all following projects. The alternative to this experimentation policy is never to experiment and have all projects rated by the original incumbent. In fact, if it is socially optimal to hire the original incumbent at t = 1, it would be also optimal to do so for any t > 1. In the following we compare the social welfare of the following two policies: "to hire always the original incumbent" and "to optimally experiment with entrants without hiring the original incumbent". Let W I denote the expected per-period social welfare (gross of a CRA's cost of obtaining a signal) from having the original incumbent I with known accuracy I rate the in…nite sequence of projects. From A1 we know that only projects that receive a good rating will be implemented. The ex ante probability that in any given period t the CRA I's signal is G is 1=2. The probability that a project is good given CRA I received a good signal is
. Hence,
Let W E denote the average per-period social welfare (gross of a CRA's cost of obtaining a signal) obtained by optimally experimenting with entrants. When the reputation of the currently active CRA is E , we have that in any given period t, Pr(
. In this instance the average social welfare should satisfy the following recursive equation:
Solving this functional equation in W E (:), we obtain
As expected, W E ( ) strictly increases with . Note that because of A1, W I and W E ( E ) are always greater than the social welfare obtained in the absence of CRAs. Experimenting with entrants is socially preferred to consistently hiring the original incumbent if W E ( E ) > W I . We have:
Proposition 1 Experimenting with the entrants is socially optimal if and only if
Note that as goes to 1, condition (1) becomes I < 1 for E > 0 implying that if agents are patient enough it is always socially optimal to experiment with entrants even if each entrant has an arbitrarily small probability of being accurate. This is not surprising since experimenting with entrants allows to identify an entrant with perfect accuracy in a number of periods that is …nite in expectation. The social welfare generated by a CRA with perfect accuracy is larger than the social welfare from the initial incumbent. Thus when the social planner is patient enough, experimenting is socially optimal.
Competition
We consider now the dynamic competitive interactions among CRAs. At the beginning of each period t, two CRAs compete in price to rate period t issuer. Charging a …xed fee f i;t is equivalent to making a bid of b i;t = f i;t to the issuer t. If b i;t and b j;t are the CRAs' bids, then the issuer pro…t maximization leads to select the CRA that solves 10 arg max h2fi;jg
Then the winning CRA invests c and discloses its signal. Let i ; j , with i j , be the reputation of the two CRAs at the beginning of period t. Then, CRA j, i.e., the CRA with the lowest reputation, cannot generate a positive pro…t in t.
Lemma 2 If at period t the CRA i's reputation is not strictly larger than its competitor's reputation, then CRA i's pro…t of period t cannot be strictly positive.
The issuer's project is implemented if and only if the CRA's signal is G. At the end of period t, event S G , F G or N realizes and the CRA's reputation is updated accordingly.
In what follows, in order to describe the competition among rating agencies we distinguish three phases: 1) Phase with no incumbent: The CRAs active at period t are two new entrants since no CRA survived from the previous period.
2) Phase with a varying reputation incumbent: The CRAs active at period t are a new entrant and an incumbent with unknown accuracy and reputation I;t + E . 3) Phase with the original incumbent: The CRAs active at period t are a new entrant with reputation E and the original incumbent with known and …xed reputation I .
Phase with no incumbent
When the only active CRAs are two entrants with identical reputation E , both CRAs will compete to attract the issuer. Since the two CRAs are identical, their expected equilibrium payo¤ will be 0 by Bertrand competition. The issuer will randomly select one of the CRAs. If the selected CRA's signal is good and the project is successful, then in t+1 its reputation will move to + E , which starts the phase with a varying reputation incumbent. Otherwise, both the selected CRA and the other CRA exit the market at the end of t according to A3(ii) and the phase with no incumbent continues.
Phase with a varying reputation incumbent
This phase with a varying reputation incumbent starts after the original incumbent has been replaced by an entrant who realized an S G event. In this phase, we have:
Lemma 3 Suppose that CRAs' signals are publicly observable. If at period t the incumbent's true accuracy is unknown and its reputation is I;t + E , then: (i) The equilibrium payo¤ of period t entrant is 0.
(ii) The equilibrium payo¤ of the incumbent is
(iii) If, in period t, the incumbent's signal is good but the project reveals to be bad (event F G ), the incumbent leaves the market at the end of period t and the phase with no incumbent starts at t + 1. Otherwise, I;t+1 I;t and the phase of a varying reputation incumbent continues in t + 1. This dynamics eventually leads to the selection of an accurate CRA that survives all periods'competition.
As is expected, in the phase with a varying reputation incumbent, the incumbent whose reputation is I;t + E wins the competition against an entrant and stays in the market unless event F G is observed. Even if the entrant of period t wins the competition (with a negative pro…t), rates the issuer t and realizes an event of S G , its reputation cannot be higher than that of the incumbent and hence, according to A3(ii), it will exit the market at the end of period t. This implies that the entrant will not pledge any future pro…t to win the competition and hence will charge a fee of c. The incumbent can match the entrant's o¤er with a fee of c + 1 2 G ( I;t ) 1 2 G ( E ) X 1 and win the competition, realizing a pro…t of ( I;t E ) X=4. Its reputation will move to + I;t I;t and 0 in event S G , N and F G respectively. Considering that the ex ante probability of these events are Pr(S G ) =
, the incumbent's equilibrium payo¤ b V ( I;t ) must satisfy the following functional equation
whose solution is given in the Lemma 3(ii).
Phase with the original incumbent
This situation occurs at t = 1 and continues as long as the original incumbent manages to stay in the market. De…ne I ( E )(> E ) as the I solving the following equation
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If CRAs'signals are publicly observable, then (i) If I I ( E ), no experimentation of any entrant is possible: the competition will lead the original incumbent to rate all projects and its equilibrium payo¤ is
whereas the equilibrium payo¤ of period t entrant is equal to 0.
(ii) If I < I ( E ), then the experimentation of the entrant occurs during the …rst period: the …rst entrant is hired and the original incumbent exits the market at the end of period 1. The entrant's expected payo¤ is
The game eventually reaches a steady state where the incumbent has the accurate type.
The proposition says that there is a cut-o¤ level of reputation I ( E )(> E ) such that if the original incumbent's reputation is higher than this threshold, it always wins the competition and hence rates all the projects; otherwise, the entrant wins the competition in period one, which induces the exit of the original incumbent at the end of period one. Since one realization of the event S G is enough to allow an entrant to kick o¤ the original incumbent, the entrant pledges the future pro…t it can realize from increasing its reputation, which the original incumbent should match in order to win the competition. It is interesting to note that an entrant makes a di¤erent o¤er to an issuer depending on whether it faces as competitor the original incumbent or an incumbent with varying reputation: the entrant pledges its future pro…t when it faces the original incumbent while it does not when it faces an incumbent with varying reputation. In other words, an entrant is more aggressive with respect to the original incumbent than with respect to an incumbent with varying reputation.
Comparison: social optimum vs. market outcome
We now compare the social optimum and the market outcome in order to see whether the market leads to too much or too little experimentation. For this purpose, we compare I ( E ) with I ( E ) and …nd:
Proposition 3 If CRA's signals are publicly observable, then the market leads to either a socially optimal experimentation of entrants or a socially excessive experimentation.
In other words, if it is socially optimal to experiment with entrants, the market outcome always leads to the experimentation. However, the market may lead to the experimentation even when this is not socially desirable. This socially excessive experimentation results from the fact that an identical entrant is more aggressive with respect to the original incumbent than with respect to an incumbent with varying reputation. This fact implies that the competition from a sequence of identical entrants reduces more the continuation payo¤ of the original incumbent than that of a varying reputation incumbent. This creates a bias against the original incumbent.
Private Information
In this section, we consider the case in which the signal that a CRA receives is private information and hence it is possible for a CRA to issue a rating that di¤ers from its private signal. The possibility of choosing the rating creates an incentive problem on the part of an entrant CRA: in order to maximize the chances of increasing its reputation an entrant CRA may have an incentive to give a rating di¤erent from its private signal. This incentive problem a¤ects the competition between the original incumbent and an entrant.
Consider the subgame that starts after the period t entrant CRA wins the competition against the original incumbent, and receives a private signal s t . This subgame is a game of incomplete information where s t 2 fG; Bg can be considered the CRA's type. Let D : fG; Bg ! [0; 1] be the CRA disclosure policy at period t: The function D maps the CRA's signal s t into the probability of giving a good rating:
For example, when the CRA truthfully reports its signal D(G) = 1 = 1 D(B), whereas D(G) = D(B) indicates that the CRA's rating is babbling and not correlated with its signal.
For a given rating r 2 fG; Bg assigned by the CRA using the disclosure policy D, let D r := Pr e X t = X r :
For example when the CRA truthfully reports its signal
hold, whereas in the babbling disclosure policy,
holds. Without loss of generality, we shall focus on disclosure policies satisfying D(G) D(B), that implies that a bad rating is no better news than a good rating. Formally,
Note that in the absence of rating, we have either X 1 or X < 1. Then, we can have
1, only the …rst and the second can happen whereas if X < 1, only the second and the third can arise. In the …rst case, all ratings of the CRA will induce project implementation. In the second case, only a good rating from the CRA induces project implementation. In the last case no rating from the CRA can induce the …nancing of the project. Hence …ve events are relevant:
S G meaning that the project was …nanced with a CRA i good rating and it succeeded;
! t = b F G meaning that the project was …nanced with a CRA i good rating and it failed, ! t = b S B meaning that the project was …nanced with a CRA i bad rating and it succeeded;
! t = b F B meaning that the project was …nanced with a CAR i bad rating and it failed;
Suppose that the time t entrant rated issuer t adopting the disclosure policy D. Since CRAs'signals are private, the market updates its belief about the entrant's accuracy by comparing the outcome of the project with the rating given by the entrant. For a given event ! t and a disclosure policy D, we shall denote
In other words, the entrant's reputation cannot su¤er (gain) from issuing a rating that is con…rmed (contradicted) by the actual quality of the project. Note that after observing outcome ! t , the entrant's own belief about its own accuracy need not coincide with its public reputation D !t . More precisely, after observing that the outcome of the project is not predicted by its signal the entrant's own belief of being accurate is 0, while if the entrant's signal corresponds to the project outcome then the entrant's belief of being accurate is + E . Since the the public has no more information than the entrant, it must be that 0 
Phase with a varying reputation incumbent
In this subsection we show that even if the signal is private information and the rating fees are ‡at, in the phase with a varying reputation incumbent, the incumbent always has an incentive to truthfully reveal its signal if its reputation is I;t + E . More precisely, suppose that time t entrant wins the competition against the original incumbent to rate issuer t and that at the end of period t it results D !t = + E , implying that the public and the entrant have the same belief + E that the entrant is accurate. In time t + 1 time t entrant becomes the new incumbent. If in the following the new incumbent keeps truth-telling, then observing the ratings is equivalent to observing the signals hence its public and "private" reputation coincide. In Lemma 3, we showed that if an incumbent with reputation I;t + E keeps truth-telling, its continuation payo¤ is given by b V ( I;t ). Remember that when we computed the above value, we assumed that any new entrant makes the competitive o¤er of f E = c and its signal becomes public information if it is chosen to rate the entrant. When the signal is private information and the incumbent's reputation is equal to or larger than + E , an entrant has no chance to replace the incumbent by building its reputation: an b S G event allows him to have at best + E and then the tie is broken in favor of the incumbent.
Therefore the entrant cares only about today's payo¤ (i.e. has no reputational concern) and for this reason has an incentive to truthfully report the signal. Therefore, any new entrant makes the competitive o¤er of f E = c and truthfully reports its signal if chosen to rate the project. What remains to be shown is that, when the incumbent's public reputation and private belief of being accurate are equal to I;t + E , then the incumbent has an incentive to truthfully report its signal. First, if the public expects the incumbent to adopt the truth-telling policy, a bad rating prevents the project implementation and then the incumbent's reputation remains unchanged leading to a continuation payo¤ of b V ( I;t ). Suppose that he received a good signal and truthfully reports it. Then, its continuation payo¤ is
. Suppose that he received a bad signal but reports a good rating. Then, its continuation payo¤ is
. Finally, the condition for a truth-telling equilibrium is
These inequalities are satis…ed for any 2 [0; 1] and for any I;t + E . Summarizing, we have:
Lemma 4 Consider competition between an entrant in period t and a varying reputation incumbent with reputation I;t + E and suppose that the incumbent's own belief of being accurate equals I;t .
(i) Even in the presence of …xed fees, both the incumbent and the entrant have an incentive to truthfully reveal their private signal.
(ii) The issuer selects the incumbent whose continuation payo¤ as function of its reputation I;t is b V ( I;t ) = X 4 3 4 3
Competition with the original incumbent
Consider competition between the original incumbent and an entrant CRA i in period t. Suppose that the entrant wins the competition to rate issuer t. Note that this implies that the entrant did not realize a positive pro…t in period t since if it charges a fee superior or equal to c, the original incumbent can win the competition. Therefore, the entrant does not generate any pro…t in period t regardless of whether it wins or not the competition. If in addition, the entrant expects that it cannot realize a positive pro…t in period t + 1, then he exits the market at the end of period t, from A3(ii). We …rst study the subgame that starts after the entrant wins the competition in which the entrant has to decide how to rate the issuer. Let V D ( ; s) denote the entrant's continuation payo¤ from having a (public) reputation t+1 = at the beginning of period t + 1, given that it received signal s 2 fG; Bg in period t. The probability represents the market's belief about its accuracy while s is the entrant's private information. We can decompose V D ( ; s) into two parts 
Property i) holds because the entrant can always exit the market at no cost. Property ii) holds because in period t + 1 if the entrant with t+1 I charges a fee f E > c, the original incumbent can defeat it by charging a fee
and in this case, from A3(ii), the entrant must exit the market by the end of t+1. To interpret Property iii), note …rst that after observing an outcome of the project that con…rms (contradicts) its private signal, the entrant's own belief of being accurate is + E (resp. 0). For instance, if (! t ; s t ) = ( b S G ; G), the entrant attaches probability + E of being accurate, whereas if (! t ; s t ) = ( b S G ; B) the entrant realizes that its signals are not informative at all. Consider, the following deviation. After observing (! t ; s t ) = ( b S G ; G), the entrant behaves as if he observed (! t ; s t ) = ( b S G ; B)
and hence ignores its private signals. Since the other market participants'strategy do not depend on the entrant's private information s t , the entrant's deviation payo¤ is
, hence property iii). These three properties imply that, after winning the competition with the original incumbent to rate issuer t, the period t entrant's equilibrium continuation payo¤
is zero . Formally, Lemma 5 Consider the subgame that starts after the period t entrant wins the competition to rate issuer t and receives a private signal s t . In all equilibria, it results
occurring with positive probability.
The lemma shows that an entrant CRA faces a fundamental con ‡ict between informative rating and reputational concern. After period t entrant rated a project, if its reputation does not increase, then the CRA has to exit the business at the end of period t. Hence the CRA has an incentive to issue the rating that maximizes its expected reputation conditional on its private signals, and for this it needs the project to be implemented, which is incompatible with truthful rating. More generally, the CRA will never issue a rating preventing the implementation of the project if it can issue another rating that induces investors to …nance the project. This is because in the absence of the project implementation, the CRA's reputation does not change, while if a project is implemented with a good rating there is some positive probability that the project is successful even if the CRA's signal is bad. As a consequence, in equilibrium, an entrant's rating cannot a¤ect the investors'decision to …nance or not the project. If the project is never implemented, the CRA will never improve its reputation. If the project is always implemented, then the disclosure strategy must be such that the negative information contained in a bad rating is not strong enough to deter investment in the project. For this to happen it must be that a bad rating is sometimes issued even when the CRA's signal is good. In other words, the disclosure policy is such that, upon receiving a good signal, the CRA gives good or bad ratings with strictly positive probabilities. Note that this requires the CRA to be indi¤erent between giving a good or a bad rating, which is possible only if the CRA's expected continuation payo¤ does not depend on the rating. Note however that such disclosure policy also implies that di¤erent ratings have di¤erent information content and hence, the CRA's expected change in reputation given a good signal actually depends on the rating it issues. But the indi¤erent condition for the CRA implies that CRA continuation payo¤ must be nil for all ratings.
We now study the competition between the original incumbent and an entrant in period t. From Lemma 5, it follows that period t entrant facing the original incumbent cannot pledge future pro…ts to attract period-t issuer hence in period t the maximum fee it can charge is c and hence the original incumbent will always be hired by the issuer. Therefore, we have:
Proposition 4 Under assumptions A1, A2, A3(i)-(iii), when the signal is private information and the entrants charge …xed fees there is never experimentation of any entrant and the original incumbent dominates the market forever.
Surprisingly, even an entrant with the initial reputation E equal to I cannot win the competition against the original incumbent. On the one hand, the entrant has no pro…t to pledge (from Lemma 5). On the other hand, it cannot commit to truthful reporting of the signal: a truthful reporting of the signal implies that it can improve its reputation to + E and obtain a continuation payo¤ of b V ( + E ) > 0 (from Lemma 4), which contradicts Lemma 5.
Extensions

General distribution of types
To be written
Multiple Issuers
Let us consider the case where there are N …nite issuers per period. We consider the following timing within a time period:
CRAs propose their fees to each issuer.
Each issuer decides whether to select a CRA and if yes which CRA.
Each CRA gives ratings in a sequential way.
The decision to implement or not each project is made.
The outcomes of the implemented projects are realized.
So before a CRA starts to give a rating, it knows the number of issuers who decided to obtain their rating from itself. The main assumption we make is that an entrant CRA gives multiple ratings in a sequential way. In addition, we maintain the assumption A2 that one successful prediction is enough to boost an entrant's reputation above that of the original incumbent. More precisely, we assume that in the benchmark of public signal, the entrant's reputation becomes at least + E > I if for at least one issuer the entrant's signal corresponds to the project outcome and for no other issuer the entrant's signal is contradicted by the outcome.
In the case CRAs'signals are private information, the entrant faces the same con ‡ict of interest as in the case of one issuer per period and experimentation is impossible when fees are ‡at.
Proposition 5 Under assumption A1, A2, A3(i)-(iii), when the signal is private information, the entrants charge …xed fees and there are n issuer per period that are rated sequentially, there is never experimentation of any entrant and the original incumbent dominates the market forever.
The argument is simple. For simplicity let N = 2 and consider the competition between the original incumbent and time t entrant. If in equilibrium the entrant provides rating only to the last issuer, then we are in the same situation as in the previous section and the result follows from Proposition 4. Suppose then that in equilibrium the entrant rates the …rst issuer. If the …rst issuer rating does not induce implementation of the …rst project, then the entrant continuation payo¤ only depends on the rating of the second issuer and the same argument of Proposition 4 applies also to this case, implying that the entrant continuation payo¤ is nil. Hence, the entrant knows that unless it provides a rating that induces implementation of the …rst project, it cannot obtain positive continuation payo¤s in the future. But this would imply that he always has an incentive to have the …rst project implemented and again we can apply the arguments in Proposition 4 to show that it cannot obtain positive expected pro…t.
Multiple ratings
Complete Contracts
Suppose that the signal is private information but each CRA can use complete contracts, i.e. rating fees can be contingent on the rating note: one for good rating (f G ), another for bad rating (f B ). We show that in this case, any CRA can commit to the truthful reporting of its signal and furthermore it is pro…table to do so. Suppose the period t entrant proposes an incentive compatible fee scheme inducing truthful report of its signal. Then, if period-t issuer chooses the entrant, given the credibility of the entrant rating, the project will be …nanced only if it has a good rating. Moreover, if the outcome of the project is e X t = X then the entrant reputation jumps to + E > I the original incumbent will have to exit the market and the continuation strategies and payo¤ are given by Lemma 4.
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Consider the competition between period t entrant and the original incumbent. We consider the equilibrium in which an entrant commits to truth-telling with contingent fees.
If investors believe the entrant uses a truthful disclosure strategy, then they will (not) …nance projects that received a good (bad) rating. Thus in case the entrant issues a bad rating, its reputation will not change and it will exit the market at the end of period t. If it receives a good signal, issues a good rating and the project is successful, then the entrant's reputation jumps to + E and its continuation payo¤ will be b V ( + E ) from Lemma 4. Suppose that it receives a bad signal but issues a good rating, which is an o¤-the equilibrium event. In this case, if the project is successful, then the entrant's reputation jumps to + E whereas the entrant becomes certain of being of inaccurate type since its signal has not re ‡ected the outcome of the project. In this instance let V (
12 Hence in order to commit to a truthful reporting, the entrant fee scheme must satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints.
That is met if the following su¢ cient condition is satis…ed
The …rst (second) inequality guarantees that the entrant prefer to give a bad (good) rating after receiving a bad (good) signal. Moreover f G and f B must be such that the entrant's ex-ante payo¤ is not negative:
Proposition 6 Under assumption A1, A2, A3(i)-(iii), when the signal is private information and CRAs can condition their fees to the rating, (i) If I I ( E ), no experimentation of any entrant is possible: the competition will lead the original incumbent to rate all projects and its equilibrium payo¤ is V I whereas the equilibrium payo¤ of period t entrant is equal to 0.
(ii) If I < I ( E ), then the experimentation of the entrant occurs during the …rst period: the …rst entrant is hired and the original incumbent exits the market at the end of period 1. The entrant's expected payo¤ is V E . The period 1 entrant fees are such that f G < f B . The game eventually reaches a steady state where the incumbent has the accurate type.
12 Note however that b V (
X=4 by always reporting a bad signal, inducing no implementation and hence keeping his reputation at + E forever. In this way each period, it generates a pro…t of ( + E E )X=4.
Policy implications
The credit rating agencies have used a fee structure that generates a con ‡ict of interest as is explained by Co¤ee (2008) in a recent congressional testimony: "Today, the rating agencies receives one fee to consult with a client, explain its model, and indicate the likely outcome of the rating process; then, it receives a second fee to actually deliver the rating (if the client wishes to go forward once it has learned the likely outcome). The result is that the client can decide not to seek the rating if it learns that it would be less favorable than it desires; the result is a loss of transparency to the market."
In our model, we already considered the Cuomo plan (i.e. a constant fee that does not depend on ratings) and assumed away rating shopping (a rating becomes always public). This is normally the solution to resolve the con ‡ict of interest that incumbent CRAs face (Bolton et al. (2009) and Mathis et al. (2009) ). This also solves rating in ‡ation generated by asset complexity and rating shopping (Skreta and Veldkamp, (2009) ). Therefore, it is surprising that even if we took into account the proposed measures to improve the credit rating industry, we …nd that there is a natural barrier to entry such that can leave a rather inaccurate incumbent in a monopolistic position without being worried about the entry of potentially more competent entrants. (2009)) …nd that changing from the issuer-pays pricing to the investor-pays pricing can solve both the (incumbents') con ‡ict of interest and the rating in ‡ation although the investor-pays pricing can create its own problem of free-riding among investors. On the contrary, in our model, the switch to the investor-pays pricing does not remove the natural barrier to entry since an entrant CRA still su¤ers from the reputational con ‡ict of interest: as long as we assume Bertrand competition between CRAs, the proof of Lemma 5 applies to the investor-pays pricing and hence Proposition 4 applies as well. Table 1 summarizes the previous policy proposals and their impacts.
Quite to the opposite of the Cuomo plan, the remedy that can open the credit rating market to competition consists in giving more freedom to entrant CRAs as to the way they determine their rating fees. In fact, when rating fees are non-contingent on the note, the entrant faces a con ‡ict of interest due to the fact that it cannot build up reputation when a project is not implemented. In order to truthfully deliver its signal, when the signal is negative, the entrant CRA should be compensated for the cost due to the fact that it cannot build reputation when the project is not implemented. Hence the entrant rating fees should be allowed to be larger when it provides a bad rating compared to the entrant's fee for a good rating. This is the exact opposite practice of the current market. Actually, in the current market, issuers can engage in rating shopping such that an issuer can decide not to disclose its rating. Then, contingent fees that specify the fee for a bad rating higher than the fee for a good rating cannot be implemented since an issuer prefers making a bad rating not disclosed to paying an extra fee to make a bad rating disclosed. Although mandated disclosure seems to be an obvious suggestion, it seems to be di¢ cult to implement it in practice. 
Conclusion
Reputational concern is often argued as the key force guaranteeing the well-functioning of the credit rating market by reducing con ‡ict of interest of incumbent CRAs. For instance, according to Standard & Poor's testimony to SEC's public hearing (held on November 15, 2002), "Most importantly, the ongoing value of Standard & Poor's credit ratings business is wholly dependent on continued market con…dence in the credibility and reliability of its credit ratings. No single issuer fee or group of fees is important enough to risk jeopardizing the agency's reputation and its future." 14 However, reputational concern seems to be a double-edged sword: paradoxically, we found that reputational concern creates a serious con ‡ict of interest on the part of entrant CRAs such that they cannot credibly commit to truthful reporting, which induces the credit rating market to fail to select competent CRAs. As a consequence, we found that a relatively inaccurate CRA can maintain a monopolistic position even when facing entry 13 According to Skreta and Veldkamp (2009, p. 691) , "The line between informal advice and rating can be easily blurred. Prohibiting a discussion of how various assets might be rated if they were issued could easily be ruled an infringement on free speech."
14 http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/standardpoors.htm from potentially more competent CRAs. This result explains why this sector experiences such a high level of concentration enjoying relatively high returns but provides a service of questionable quality. Furthermore, the measures proposed to eliminate incumbent CRAs' con ‡ict of interest such as the Cuomo plan (i.e. no contingent fee) combined with no rating shopping or switch to the issuer-pays pricing are not helpful to eliminate this barrier to entry resulting from entrants'reputational concern. Allowing fees contingent on ratings combined with no rating shopping can facilitate entry in the credit rating business but the relation between the level of fees and the sign of rating should be opposite to the current practice; entrant CRAs should be allowed to charge higher fees for a bad rating than for a good rating. This policy leads to social optimum when the expected entrant's accuracy is close enough to, or not much smaller than, the original incumbent's actual accuracy. For intermediate values of the entrant expected accuracy, contingent fees can lead to over experimentation of entrant CRAs. Still we believe that this policy remains optimal for a forward looking government as the region where contingent fees lead to excessive entry shrinks as the discount factor increases.
Although our paper and previous papers agree on that eliminating rating shopping helps to improve the functioning of the credit rating market, our results suggest that the fee structure that eliminates incumbents'con ‡ict of interest incompatible with the one that eliminates entrants'con ‡ict of interest. The former requires restricting it to a constant fee whereas the second requires giving a freedom such that fees can be contingent on ratings. If the regulator cannot make a CRA-speci…c regulation of the fee structure, it has to make a tough choice between reducing incumbents'con ‡ict of interest and facilitating the entry.
Some recent papers have o¤ered explanations of the CRAs'failures. These models generate in ‡ated ratings due to CRAs'tendency to be too lax and/or to issuers'predilection for publishing only good ratings. In our model, even though CRAs can manipulate their ratings, in equilibrium an incumbent CRA truthfully reports its signal. Hence our explanation of recent rating in ‡ation relates to the possibility that inaccurate CRAs dominate the market. In fact, an inaccurate CRA can make two types of errors: give a good rating to a bad security or a bad rating to a good security. However since only good rating securities tend to be issued, the error we should observe in data are of the …rst type, resulting in an observation of rating in ‡ation.
Our paper is a …rst attempt to study the lack of entry in the credit rating market. It is worthwhile to study other factors (di¤erent from entrants'con ‡icts of interest) that generate entry barrier in this market.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 2
Let i , j , with i j be period t reputation of the two competing agencies at period t. If CRA i wants to generate a positive pro…t, then it cannot bid more than c. However, CRA j can easily win period t competition by bidding c (
, realizing a positive pro…t.
Proof of Lemma 3
(i) The entrant's initial reputation is E (< + E I;t ), and at the end of period t it can be at most + E I;t . If the entrant does not rate the issuer t, it make zero pro…t at t and expects zero pro…t in t + 1 (because of Lemma 2) and hence exits the market at the end of t because of Assumption A3(ii). Hence the entrant's overall payo¤ is zero. If in period t the entrant rates the issuer t it must realize a negative pro…t in t (because of Lemma 2). Since in period t + 1 its reputation is at most + E , Bertrand competition with the incumbent implies that the entrant cannot make any positive pro…t in t + 1 and hence exits the market at the end of t according to A3(ii).
(ii) From the proof of (i), we know that as long as the incumbent stays in the market, every period each new entrant charges a fee of c and hence the incumbent can gain period t issuer by charging a fee of c + 1 2
G ( E )) X realizing a pro…t of ( I;t E ) X=4. its reputation will move to + I;t I;t and 0 in event S G , N and F G respectively. Considering that the ex ante probability of these events are Pr(S G ) = I;t +1 4
, Pr(N ) = 1=2 and Pr(F G ) =
, the incumbent equilibrium payo¤ b V ( I;t ) must satisfy the following functional equation
whose solution is given in the lemma.
(iii) Suppose now the incumbent rates the period t issuer. If an event F G occurs, then the reputation of the incumbent drops to 0 and he exits the market. In this case the entrant realizes zero pro…t at t and he expects to face in t + 1 and new entrant with the same reputation, hence he expects zero pro…t at t + 1. As a consequence he will exit at the end of t.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the competition between the original incumbent and the entrant in period one. If the entrant rates period one project and realizes an S G event, its reputation becomes + E > I and then either the entrant will also rate period 2 issuer if the original incumbent remains in the market or the original incumbent will rate period 2 issuer but will realize negative pro…t to compensate the issuer for its lower reputation. This together with A3(ii) implies that the original incumbent exits the market and then from period 2 the phase with a varying reputation incumbent starts with the incumbent's expected continuation payo¤ equal to b V ( + E ). If the entrant does not rate period one project, the entrant will exit the market at the end of period one with zero pro…t from A3(ii). Thus the maximum that the entrant is willing to pay to have the opportunity to rate period one project is
Let V I denote the original incumbent's continuation payo¤ in period 2 when it is not replaced. The value to the incumbent of rating period one project is c(1 ) + V I while the value to the incumbent of letting the entrant rate period one project is (1
)V I where the original incumbent is assumed to remain period two incumbent whenever the entrant does not manage to increase its reputation.
15 Thus, the maximum that the original incumbent is willing to pay to have the opportunity to rate period one project is
Therefore, the competition to rate period one project will be won by the incumbent whenever
that is satis…ed for I I ( E ) and all non-negative V I . In this instance the incumbent can win the competition with the entrant by o¤ering the issuer a bid of 1
c. Since the same situation occurs in every period, it must be that V I = V I . Note that if I < I ( E ) and nevertheless the original incumbent rates projects all the time, its stage payo¤ will be ( I E )
leading to a negative pro…t to the incumbent. Hence when I < I ( E ), we have V I = 0 and it will be period 1 entrant who rates the period one project. To win the competition, the entrant pays ( I E )
X 4 c to the issuer and realizes an overall expected payo¤ of V E . Once the entrant replaces the original incumbent, the phase with a varying reputation incumbent starts and eventually this leads to the selection of an accurate CRA.
Proof of Lemma 5
We begin by a lemma regarding the possible values of 
Then the entrant's expected period t + 1 pro…t by giving a good rating is
all s 2 fG; Bg. Therefore, the continuation payo¤ conditional on giving a good rating is strictly positive and hence strictly larger than the continuation payo¤ of giving a bad rating regardless of whether the entrant receives a good signal or a bad signal. Hence in equilibrium it must be D(G) = D(B) = 1 implying requires that the entrant does not strictly prefer to report a rating opposite to its signal. This translates into the following incentive compatibility constraints:
(1
If both (2) and (3) are strict, then the entrant …nds it optimal to truthfully report its signal. But since E > min , this would imply X D G > 1 > X D B and leads to a contradiction. If both (2) and (3) hold with equality, then from G ( E ) = (1 B ( E )) = (1 + E ) =2 and B ( E ) = (1 G ( E )) = (1 E ) =2, we have 
which contradicts property iii) whenever D t+1 ( b G G ; G) > 0. Suppose then that (2) is strict but (3) is weak. In this instance the entrant strictly prefers to truthfully report a good signal but after receiving a bad signal he is indi¤erent between reporting G or D. We already eliminated truthful reporting for both signals and we know that always reporting a good rating cannot change the entrant's reputation. 
Proof of Proposition 5
The argument is simple. Consider the competition between the original incumbent and an entrant in period t. Note that the entrant can attract one of the issuers only by charging a negative fee that compensate the issuer for its relatively low reputation. Thus, the entrant can survive the next period only if its reputation increases. Suppose the entrant is hired by the last of the N issuers and if some of the N 1 previous issuers was rated by the entrant, then either the entrant rating induces no implementation or the entrant past disclosure policies are such that the outcomes of past projects cannot lead to a reputation t+1 generating a strictly positive continuation value. Then we are in the same situation as in the previous section as the last issuer is crucial for building the entrant's reputation. Hence we can obtain the result using the same argument as in Proposition 4. Consider then the case where the one before the last issuer (issuer N 1) is rated but outcomes of previous project cannot lead to to a reputation generating a strictly positive continuation value. Note that:
1. Truth-telling cannot be an equilibrium for the entrant since a rating of B (resp. G) induce no implementation (resp. implementation) of the (N 1)-th project implying the entrant continuation payo¤ is zero (resp. positive). But then the entrant would prefer to give a rating of G independently of its signal.
2. If the entrant equilibrium disclosure strategy is such that the (N 1)-th project is not implemented independently from the entrant rating, then the entrant continuation payo¤ is nil.
3. If the ex-ante probability of success and the entrant equilibrium disclosure strategy are such that the (N 1)-th will be implemented independently of the entrant rating, then an argument along the same lines of point 3. in the proof of Lemma 5 can be made to show that the entrant expected continuation payo¤ must be nil.
Applying recursively the argument for the N issuers it is clear that is impossible that the entrant adopts a disclosure policy that leads to a reputation generating a strictly positive continuation value with positive probability. Thus, it cannot pledge future payo¤ and will propose a rating fee of c to each of the N issuers, who then prefer to be rated by the original incumbent.
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. The competition to rate period one project will be won by the original incumbent whenever
which is satis…ed for I I ( E ) and all non-negative V I . In this instance the incumbent can win the competition with the entrant by o¤ering the issuer a bid of 1
c. Since the same situation occurs in every period, it must be that V I = V I . When I < I ( E ) it results V I = 0 and it will be period 1 entrant to rate the period one project. In order to win the competition, the entrant will make an expected payment to the issuer of
and realize an overall expected payo¤ of V E . It is straightforward to see that there are (f G ; f B ) satisfying the previous equality as well as the entrant's incentive compatibility constraints that implies f G < f B .
